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Reaching A Settlement Before the 
Arbitration Hearing 
Darius Chan (Norton Rose Fulbright)/March 3, 2011 /Leave a comment 
YSIAC 
Will a court injunct arbitral proceedings if parties, before an arbitration hearing, 
allegedly reach a settlement agreement and a dispute subsequently arises over 
the existence of such an agreement? Is the tribunal functus? 
Recently, the Singapore High Court in Doshion Ltd v Sembawang Engineers 
and Constructors Pte Ltd [2011] SGHC 46 (“Doshion”) rightly held that no 
injunction would lie in such an instance. It is a decision to be welcomed. 
In that case, the two parties were parties to arbitration proceedings under certain 
construction contracts (“the Sub-Contracts”). The arbitration was scheduled to 
start on 28 February 2011. The claimant contended that an oral settlement was 
reached between the solicitors for the parties on 15 February 2011 and the 
arbitration proceedings should be terminated as of that date. The defendant 
denied the existence of any settlement. 
The defendant characterised the claimant’s argument as one where the tribunal 
had become functus officio because of the settlement. The defendant cited a 
recent English High Court decision of Martin Dawes v Treasure & Son 
Ltd [2010] EWHC 3218 (“Dawes”) and contended that the issue of whether an 
arbitrator was functus went to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, which was a matter 
for the arbitrator to decide. 
In finding for the defendant, the Singapore High Court’s reasoning was built on 
three pillars: 
(a) the arbitrator was not functus since the tribunal had not even begun to hear 
the dispute; 
(b) adopting the commercially sensible approach in Fiona Trust & Holding Corp 
v Privalov [2007] UKHL 40, that an dispute over the existence of an settlement 
agreement would be caught by the ambit of the arbitration agreement in the Sub-
Contracts; and 
(c) in any event, any dispute about the scope of an arbitration agreement was a 
matter for the arbitral tribunal based on the doctrine of kompetenz-komptenz. 
It was not strictly necessary for the defendant to characterize the plaintiff’s 
argument as one relating to functus officio – the plaintiff faced an uphill task from 
the get go. Section 6 of Singapore’s International Arbitration Act (the Act 
incorporates the Model Law) requires a court to refer the dispute to arbitration 





unless the agreement was “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed”. In Tjong Very Sumito v Antig Investments Pte Ltd [2009] SGCA 
41, the Singapore Court of Appeal astutely held that in line with its prevailing 
philosophy of judicial non-intervention in arbitration, the Court would interpret the 
word “dispute” in Section 6 broadly, and would readily find that a dispute existed 
unless the defendant had unequivocally admitted that the claim was due and 
payable. In circumstances where the defendant prevaricates (ie, first making an 
admission and then later purporting to deny the claim on the ground that the 
admission was mistaken, or fraudulently obtained, or was never made), the 
matter would ordinarily still be referred to arbitration. The Court’s approach is 
commendable in giving full effect to the parties’ specified mode of dispute 
resolution. 
When we apply this reasoning to Doshion, whether any alleged settlement was 
reached before or during the arbitral hearing would not, as a matter of principle, 
affect the question of which fora decides whether the settlement exists. It is 
important to ask the right question. That question is whether the underlying 
dispute remains unresolved. Any settlement would be in relation to the underlying 
dispute arising out of the Sub-Contracts. Accordingly, any dispute about the 
settlement originates from the underlying dispute. To answer the question, any 
dispute about the settlement means that the underlying dispute remains 
unresolved. So unless the defendant unequivocally admits the claim or 
acknowledges that there has been a settlement such that there is no longer a 
dispute, the Court will refer the matter to arbitration. Conceptually, since any 
prevarication by the defendant on the admission of the claim would be a matter 
to be referred to arbitration, any prevarication by the defendant on the settlement 
of the claim must have the same outcome. 
This reasoning based on first principles would have been sufficient to dispose 
of Doshion. The claimant did not, and presumably could not, show that there had 
been a waiver of the arbitration agreement or an agreement to end the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction. 
The going only gets tougher for the claimant if it embarks on the functus 
officio route. Akenhead J in Dawes rejected the argument that a tribunal 
becomes functus once a settlement has been reached during arbitral 
proceedings. 
In Dawes, the claimant (Dawes) engaged a contractor (Treasure) to carry out 
construction works at his country estate. Disputes arose and Treasure 
commenced arbitration proceedings before Mr Ian Salisbury. After the parties 
had pleaded their respective cases, they agreed upon a settlement. However, the 
scope of the settlement was not documented in a consent order or final award. 
Subsequently, Dawes issued his own arbitration notice in respect of related 
disputes but appointed a different arbitrator. Treasure asked Mr Salisbury to rule 





that he retained jurisdiction in relation to the “new” dispute, and that it had been 
compromised by the settlement agreement. The first arbitrator ruled in favour of 
Treasure on both points, which was challenged by Dawes on the ground that Mr 
Salisbury was already functus officio after the settlement. 
In dismissing Dawes’ application, Akenhead J relied on, inter alia, Section 51 of 
the English Arbitration Act 1996. Section 51 provides that if parties settle the 
dispute during arbitral proceedings, the tribunal shall terminate the substantive 
proceedings and, if so requested, produce a consent award. Accordingly, 
Akenhead J held that the settlement of a dispute after it had been referred to 
arbitration, but before any final award, did not generally bring an end to the 
arbitrator’s jurisdiction and make him functus officio. Even if the dispute was 
settled “there remains a jurisdiction to terminate the substantive proceedings and 
to resolve issues of costs or any other matters in dispute”. That jurisdiction was 
otherwise not statutorily limited, and neither did parties preclude or limit such 
jurisdiction in their settlement. 
Akenhead J also observed that Mr Salisbury “would undoubtedly still have 
retained jurisdiction if there had been an issue between the parties as to whether 
there was any settlement at all. He would still have been the arbitrator to resolve 
the underlying disputes which would include ruling upon a defence that the claim 
had been settled.” 
The Model Law’s counterpart of Section 51 of the English Arbitration Act is found 
in Article 30 which deals specifically with settlement. The lesson taught by the 
two cases highlighted here is that if a party wants to put an end to a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction immediately after settlement, it will generally have to show an 
agreement to end the tribunal’s jurisdiction, whether as part of the settlement 
itself or as a separate agreement. Unfortunately for the claimant in Doshion, 
there is no shortcut. 
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